Keywords
Polish bid rigging, bid rigging, single economic unit, withdrawal of an offer, economic analysis, bid suppression
Abstract
The paper discusses the specific, novel form of bid rigging that was the basis for recent bid rigging cases in Poland. The analyzed scheme is conceptually different from canonical bid rigging which is usually meant to over-charge the public purchaser. By contrast, the “Polish bid rigging” scheme involves two entrepreneurs participating in the same tender and one entrepreneur withdrawing his lower bid after he was chosen by the procuring public authority (allowing the latter entrepreneur to win the tender). The author discusses the economic considerations standing behind “the Polish bid rigging strategy” and argues that, in most cases, the Polish scheme constituted a unilateral practice rather than an agreement captured by competition laws.
Recommended Citation
Semeniuk, P. (2013). “Polish bid rigging” – critique. internetowy Kwartalnik Antymonopolowy i Regulacyjny (internet Quarterly on Antitrust and Regulation), 2(1), 53-67. Retrieved from https://press.wz.uw.edu.pl/ikar/vol2/iss1/5
First Page
53
Last Page
67
Page Count
14
Publisher
University of Warsaw
