ORCID
Giulia Schneider: 0000-0002-6244-717X
Keywords
abuse, collaborative governance, data sharing, data silos, merger
Abstract
The study moves from the assumption that the sharing of data can – under specific circumstances – give rise to anticompetitive aggregations of research-valuable data in the form of closed data silos. It addresses the question whether and how competition remedies available under EU law can be used for the design of pro-competitive data pools in digital markets. Interesting suggestions for these purposes are given by the recent enforcement policies enacted by the European Commission in high technology innovation markets. Although aimed at restoring very different anticompetitive conducts, these remedies nonetheless appear to share the common function of opening up established innovation alliances for the transfer of research-valuable information assets to external competing parties. Against this backdrop, the suitability of such information-based remedies in the context of digital markets is questioned. The study ultimately puts forward the opportunity of a close collaboration between competition and data protection authorities for a joint governance of data sharing remedies.
Recommended Citation
Schneider, G. (2020). Designing Pro-Competitive Research Data Pools: Which EU Competition Remedies for Research Data Silos in Digital Markets?. Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, 13(21), 161-186. https://doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2020.13.21.6
First Page
161
Last Page
186
Page Count
25
Received Date
11.03.2020
Accepted Date
30.05.2020
DOI
10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2020.13.21.6
Publisher
University of Warsaw
