Keywords
competition policy, state-owned enterprises, merger control, foreign subsidies, EU competition law
Abstract
State-owned firms from third countries play an increasingly significant role in international mergers and acquisitions, raising concerns about distortions of competition. These distortions arise from state-backed financial advantages, preferential treatment, and industrial policy objectives, potentially undermining market competition. This paper categorises different forms of competitive distortions, focusing on acquisitions financed by foreign state resources. Through an analysis of German and EU merger control cases (2012-2023), we assess the extent of this phenomenon and the treatment of such transactions by the respective competition authorities. While direct state involvement remains rare, it is prevalent in strategic industries such as energy and transport. We discuss potential policy responses, including expanded notification requirements, revised theories of harm, and stricter intervention criteria. However, we caution against excessive regulatory overreach that could lead to protectionist distortions. Our findings advocate for a nuanced approach to merger control that ensures competitive neutrality while safeguarding against state-driven market distortions.
Acknowledgements
Funding
This article received no funding.
Declaration of Conflict of Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and publication of this article.
Declaration about the scope of AI utilization
The authors declared using AI tools in the preparation of this article.
We would like to thank two anonymous reviewers and the discussants at the ECONtribute LawEcon Workshop at the University of Bonn (January 2025) for their valuable comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this paper.
Recommended Citation
Stöhr, A., & Budzinski, O. (2025). Addressing the Impact of Foreign State-Owned Companies: Implications for Fair and Effective Merger Control. Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, 18(31), 187-222. https://doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2025.18.31.9
First Page
187
Last Page
222
Page Count
36
Received Date
28.03.2025
Accepted Date
04.08.2025
DOI
10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2025.18.31.9
JEL Code
K21, L40, L44, L50
Publisher
University of Warsaw
