Keywords
collective dominance, oligopoli problem, tacit collusion, Article 102
Abstract
This paper examines the European Commission’s Draft Guidelines on Article 102 TFEU, focusing on their treatment of collective dominance in oligopolistic markets. While the Guidelines adopt a structured framework derived from merger control, they fail to address a key challenge specific to Article 102: the need for clear evidentiary standards in retrospective enforcement. The paper argues that parallel conduct by independent firms can, in certain cases, serve as evidence of collective dominance where such behaviour is not rational absent joint market power. However, the Draft Guidelines offer little guidance on how to integrate such conduct into the dominance analysis. This gap risks leaving the collective dominance conceptually recognised but practically underenforced, thereby limiting the EU’s ability to tackle anticompetitive outcomes in concentrated markets.
Acknowledgements
Funding
This article received no funding.
Declaration of Conflict of Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and publication of this article.
Declaration about the scope of AI utilisation
The author did not use AI tools in the preparation of this article.
Recommended Citation
Marinova, M. (2025). Collective Dominance Under Scrutiny: Closing the Enforcement Gap or Complicating EU Competition Policy?. Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, 18(31), 37-63. https://doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2025.18.31.4
First Page
37
Last Page
63
Page Count
27
Received Date
29.04.2025
Accepted Date
13.05.2025
DOI
10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2025.18.31.4
JEL Code
K1, K2
Publisher
University of Warsaw
