Keywords
Indefeasible Right of Use (IRU), long-term agreement, third party access, telecom market, entry barriers, infrastructure owner, entrants, infrastructure, EU projects
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to present an Indefeasible Right of Use (IRU) as a possible remedy for telecom infrastructure EU projects that (in Poland) have been lagged behind the time. Thanks for IRU, Beneficiaries of these EU projects will be able to save both: time and money and will finish projects successfully. The author discusses two possible methods of implementing IRU: via regulatory obligation and via incumbent’s goodwill. The author proposes a game theory model with payoffs depending on regulator’s and incumbent’s strategies. Using a game theory tree, the author shows that if only the incumbent is willing to offer his own network, IRU may be signed and most delays in EU projects disappear. The success is not so obvious while implementing IRU as an obligation – in this case EU projects will probably fail.
Recommended Citation
Olender-Skorek, M. (2012). To regulate or not to regulate? – Economic Approach to Indefeasible Right of Use (IRU). Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, 5(7), 143-155. Retrieved from https://press.wz.uw.edu.pl/yars/vol5/iss7/6
First Page
143
Last Page
155
Page Count
12
Publisher
University of Warsaw
Publication Date
2012-11-30
