ORCID
Ondrej Blažo: 0000-0001-9721-8724
Keywords
Competition law, EU law, Slovakia, prioritization, parliamentary, surveillance, rejection of complaints, credibility of NCA, accountability of NCA
Abstract
The paper tries to establish some limits of the framework for prioritization policy in order to show that the NCAs are still bound by certain principles for setting their prioritization policies and are not completely independent or autonomous. In this context, priority setting by the Slovak NCA, surveillance of this process and evaluation of its credibility is analysed. The power to prioritize cases became a part of the ‘independence toolkit’ of the ECN+ Directive and is linked to effective use of limited resources. Despite including prioritization into the elements of independence of NCAs, the ECN+ Directive gives no further requirements for the prioritisation of the performance of enforcement powers of NCAs. Decisions regarding prioritization of enforcement can allow a NCA to focus on the most serious infringements of competition law. On the other hand, they can be challenged due to lack of transparency, arbitrariness, disproportionality and because of unequal treatment. Hence the prioritization policy, as well as individual decisions, shall be embedded into the framework safeguarding proper enforcement and due process of law. The legal framework of the European Commission for the system of rejection of cases as well as limited judicial review can serve as an inspiration for NCAs. Although NCAs are not restricted in the selection of their priorities, some competition infringements shall be inevitably included in their priorities, such as cartels and bid rigging. The case of Slovakia and its NCA shows a relatively low level of accountability of the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic (AMO) to the parliament, and judicial as well as parliamentary control of the prioritization and case selection of the AMO is limited.The paper concludes that within the reform of the Slovak NCA, it will be insufficient to only grant the AMO guarantees of independence, including independence of priority setting, and that mechanisms of accountability and review shall be evolved.
Recommended Citation
Blažo, O. (2020). Proper, transparent and just prioritization policy as a challenge for national competition authorities and prioritization of the Slovak NCA. Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, 13(22), 117-144. https://doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2020.13.22.5
First Page
117
Last Page
144
Page Count
27
Received Date
25.02.2020
Accepted Date
23.07.2020
DOI
10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2020.13.22.5
Publisher
University of Warsaw
Publication Date
2020-12-18
